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MEDICAID ASSISTANCE FOR ELECTIVE
ABORTIONS: THE STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
In Roe v. Wade,' the Supreme Court held that women have the
right2 to an abortion free from any state interference3 during the
first trimester of pregnancy, but that from the commencement of
the second trimester, the state may impose such regulations as are
reasonably related to maternal health.4 The ramifications of this
landmark decision5 are not yet completely clear. One issue which
has been the subject of much litigation since Wade is the validity of
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion and its
implications, see Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and
Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (1974); Comment, Roe v. Wade-The Abortion
Decision -An Analysis and Its Implications, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 844 (1973). Constitutional
analyses of the Wade decision may be found in Note, The Right to Abortion: Expansion of the
Right of Privacy Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CATH. LAW. 36 (1973); Note, A New
Constitutional Right to an Abortion, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1573 (1973).
2 The Court determined that the "right of privacy .. . founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action ... is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. at
153. Nonetheless, this "right" is less than absolute. As the Court declared,
a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintain-ing medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy,
these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the
factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore,
cannot be said to be absolute.
ll. at 154.
"The Wade Court noted that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest' .. " Id. at 155 (citation omitted). The Court concluded that during the first
trimester of pregnancy there can be no "compelling state interest" tojustify any state regulation
of the abortion decision; hence, during that period a woman has the right to have an
abortion free from any state interference. Id. at 163.
4 Id. The Court held, moreover, that once the point of viability is reached, the state may,
if it so chooses, completely proscribe the performance of abortions, except where necessary
to protect maternal health. The Court reasoned that once the fetus becomes viable the
state has a compelling interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. Id. at 163-64.
According to the Court, viability usually occurs "at about seven months (28 weeks) but may
occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id. at 160 (footnote omitted). For another interpretation of
when viability occurs, see Horan, Viability, Values, and the Vast Cosmos, 22 CATH. LAW. 1
(1976).
5 The Supreme Court also decided a companion abortion case the same day, Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), in which it discussed some of the regulations which a state may
or may not constitutionally impose during the second trimester of pregnancy. Together,
these decisions constitute what is generally known as the Supreme Court's "landmark"
abortion decision. For a discussion of the possible ramifications of the Supreme Court's
abortion decision in the context of Medicaid reimbursements for nontherapeutic abortions,
see Schulte, Tax-Supported Abortions: The Legal Issues, 21 CATH. LAW. 1 (1975).
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a claim to Medicaid assistance pursuant to Title XIX of the Social
Security Act 6 by an indigent mother who chooses to undergo an
"elective abortion," i.e., an abortion not necessitated by danger to
her life or health. 7 Absent assistance from the state, the indigent
mother usually does not have the means to pay for the abortion
herself. Thus, if the state cannot, or will not, absorb the costs of the
abortion, the woman has little choice but to bear the child.
In order to qualify and retain eligibility to receive federal
funds for its Medicaid program, a state must adhere to certain
stringent federal guidelines." May a state, consonant with the rigid
federal strictures imposed upon it, properly reimburse a woman
for an elective abortion? Does Title XIX require the state to pro-
vide such medical assistance? Since the guidelines of Title XIX
govern state Medicaid disbursements, and consequently, dictate
whether a state is permitted or required to provide medical assis-
tance for elective abortions, these issues must necessarily be de-
cided on a statutory basis. Assuming, arguendo, that a state policy
restricting Medicaid reimbursement to therapeutic abortions is
consistent with Title XIX, may a state constitutionally deny medical
assistance for elective abortions while at the same time providing
such assistance for therapeutic abortions and childbirth?
The purpose of this Comment is to consider both the statutory
and constitutional issues presented by a state's denial of Medicaid
assistance for nontherapeutic abortions. A recent case, Roe v. Nor-
ton,9 provides a vehicle for the exploration of these novel, yet
642 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
The elective abortion is commonly known as the "nontherapeutic" abortion. Webster's
defines "therapeutic abortion" as an "abortion induced when pregnancy constitutes a threat
to the mother's life." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2372 (1966). The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that a therapeutic abortion is one
"necessary for the health of the patient as distinguished from elective abortions requested by
a woman after consultation with her physician merely because, for whatever reasons, she
does not wish to bear the child." Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1975). The
court's definition, which encompasses abortions necessitated by dangers to the mother's
health as well as dangers to her life, is the more common definition. Most state statutes and
regulations also characterize a therapeutic abortion as one necessitated by dangers to ei-
ther the mother's life or health. See, e.g., 3 Conn. Welfare Dep't, Public Assistance Program
Manual, ch. III, § 275, as appearing in Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 930 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975).
See also Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761
(U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-554).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). In general, the federal
guidelines provide that in order to receive federal funds for its Medicaid program, a state
must provide, at a minimum, certain specified medical services to certain specified groups of
individuals who qualify for medical assistance under the program. See notes 12-20 and
accompanying text infra.
! 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975), revg and remanding 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974)
(mem.), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) (mem.) (three-judge court), prob.jflris.
noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-1440).
[Vol. 50:751
1976] MEDICAID ASSISTANCE FOR ABORTIONS
potentially explosive issues. One caveat must be noted. As the
Supreme Court observed in Wade, the abortion question is a "sensi-
tive and emotional" controversy, rife with "deep and seemingly
absolute convictions" on the part of the proponents of each posi-
tion.' 0 Nonetheless, the objective of this analysis is "to resolve the
issue by [statutory or] constitutional measurement, free of emotion
and of predilection."" Thus, it is imperative, for purposes of this
Comment, to accept the doctrine enunciated by the Wade Court as
a "given." The often emotional question of whether abortion is
socially or morally acceptable will not be discussed herein.
THE STATUTORY ISSUES
The Medicaid program, as established in Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, 12 provides "a comprehensive scheme of federal
financial assistance"' 3 to states that elect to participate 14 in furnish-
ing medical assistance to indigent families with dependent children,
or to persons who are elderly, blind, or disabled. 15 Such programs
are funded jointly by federal grants-in-aid and the participating
states,' 6 and although these programs are administered by the
states,' 7 they must comply, at a minimum, with the federal
guidelines contained in Title XIX. To be eligible for federal aid
under the Medicaid program, a state must provide certain mini-
10410 U.S. at 116.
JId
12 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
13 Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1975). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. IV,
1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970) (authorizing appropriations "to carry out the
purposes" of Title XIX).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970), provides, in
part, that "[t]he sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, State plans for medical assistance." State participation in the Medicaid program is
optional.
" As a condition to receipt of federal funds under Title XIX, a state must agree to
provide Medicaid assistance to persons receiving aid or assistance under state plans that are
approved under either Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974)
(assistance for the aged); Title IV, part A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp.
IV, 1974) (aid to families with dependent children); Title X, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (1970),
as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) (assistance for the blind); or Title XIV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351 etseq.
(1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) (assistance for the disabled). 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)
(Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970). These persons are classified as
"categorically needy." The state may also, at its option, agree to provide Medicaid assistance
for the "medically needy," i.e., individuals who do not meet the eligibility criteria of §
1396a(a)(10)(A), but "who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or
assistance under any such State plan" and "who have insufficient.., income and resources
to meet the costs of necessary medical and remedial care and services ...." 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (1970).
1642 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2) (1970).
1742 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(5) (1970).
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mum medical services.18 It may, however, also provide "medical
care, or any other type of remedial care recognized under State
law, furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of their
practice as defined by State law"'19 and "any other medical care,
and any other type of remedial care recognized under State law,
specified by the Secretary. '20 Despite the statute's apparently all-
inclusive coverage, controversy exists concerning reimbursement
for nontherapeutic abortions under the Medicaid program. 21
In Roe v. Norton,22 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was asked to invalidate section 275 of the Connec-
ticut Welfare Department regulations, which denied reimburse-
ment under Medicaid for elective abortions.23 The court held that
while Title XIX does not preclude a participating state from pro-
viding assistance for a nontherapeutic abortion,24 neither does it
require that a state provide such medical assistance.25
In Roe v. Norton, two women, otherwise eligible for Medicaid
assistance, 26 brought suit attacking the Connecticut regulation as
18 These required services include: (1) inpatient hospital services; (2) outpatient hospital
services; (3) other laboratory and x-ray services; (4) skilled nursing facility services, screening
and diagnosis of individuals under 21, and family planning services and supplies furnished
to individuals of child-bearing age; and (5) physician's services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(1)-(5)
(Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1970). These services must be
provided to the categorically needy, see note 16 supra, in order for the state to qualify under
Title XIX. Additionally, the state may provide certain optional services to the categorically
needy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(6)-(17) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. §§
1396d(a)(6)-(15) (1970). If the state opts to include assistance to the medically needy, see note
15 supra, it must provide either the five required services, or any combination of seven of the
optional and required services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B)-(C) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B)-(C) (1970).
1942 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(6) (1970).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(17) (Supp. IV, 1974),amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(15) (1970).
2 1 See, e.g., Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F.
Supp. 173, 183-84 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (three-judge court), modfied and remanded sub nom. Doe v.
Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No.
75-554).
22 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g and remanding 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974)
(mem.), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) (mem.) (three-judge court), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-1440).
2 As the Court noted:
The challenged regulation . . . required that as a pre-condition to coverage of
abortion services for women in Connecticut eligible for Medicaid, the abortion must
be a therapeutic one, recommended by the attending physician and the Chief of
Obstetrics and Gynecology in the accredited hospital as "medically or psychiatrically
necessary."
522 F.2d at 929 (citation omitted).24 Id. at 932.
2 2 Id at 935.
16 The women qualified for Medicaid pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (Supp.
IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970), since they were receiving Aid for
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) under Title IV, Part A of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 601 etseq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726,
728 (D. Conn. 1974).
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both inconsistent with Tite XIX and violative of the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the Constitution. 27 Plaintiff Roe was
"the unmarried mother of three small children" and was, at the
institution of the suit, 7 weeks pregnant. 28 Desiring to "avoid fur-
ther family burdens and complications, ' 29 she planned to undergo
an abortion which her physician had agreed to perform.30 Since
she was unable, however, to obtain certification that the abortion
was medically necessary, she was not entitled to Medicaid assistance
due to the operation of section 275.31 Plaintiff Poe had already had
an elective abortion and had been denied reimbursement pursuant
to section 275.32 As a result of their failure to obtain reimburse-
ment, plaintiffs brought this action challenging the validity of the
state regulation. 33
Plaintiffs, seeking a declaration that section 275 is unconstitu-
tional, moved both to convene a three-judge court 34 and for sum-
mary judgment. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion to
convene a three-judge court on the ground that, while the constitu-
tional claim was substantial enough to invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court, the pendent statutory claim could be adjudicated by
the district court without the necessity of convening a three-judge
court. 35 The court did, however, grant plaintiffs' motion for sum-
27 522 F.2d at 930.
28Jd.
291d.
30 Id.
3 1 See note 23 supra.
22 522 F.2d at 930.
3 The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides in
pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
Plaintiffs also sought a class action determination pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
Plaintiff Roe sought to represent a class of pregnant women, eligible for Medicaid, who were
unable to present certification as to the medical necessity of the requested abortion. 522 F.2d
at 930. Plaintiff Poe sought to represent a class of women, eligible for Medicaid, who had
undergone elective abortions and had been denied reimbursement due to the lack of
certification. Id. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a class action determination
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 380 F. Supp. at 730.
34 522 F.2d at 930. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), which provides, in part:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an
administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted
by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of
such statute unless ... heard and determined by a district court of three judges ....
'5 380 F. Supp. at 728. The court's reasoning followed the Supreme Court's ruling in
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1974). There, the Court held that where a claim
involving statutory construction is pendent to a substantial constitutional claim sufficient to
require the convening of a three-judge district court, the statutory issue should be decided
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mary judgment, concluding that section 275 is inconsistent with
Title XIX of the Social Security Act.36 In reaching this decision, the
court held that Title XIX not only does not preclude Medicaid
payments for elective abortions, but rather it prohibits any state
regulation which restricts such reimbursement to therapeutic abor-
tions. The district court declared that "to avoid doubts as to [its]
constitutionality" Title XIX must be construed to prohibit state
regulations that deny medical assistance for elective abortions. 37
The court of appeals had "little difficulty" agreeing with the
district court that nothing in Title XIX serves to preclude pay-
ments for elective abortions. 38 In an opinion authored by District
Judge Bryan, sitting by designation, the court noted that Title XIX
makes no specific reference to medical assistance for abortions.39
Acknowledging that "the states have wide latitude to determine the
scope of coverage and to institute wide-ranging and comprehensive
medical programs under their medical assistance plans,"40 the
court concluded that payments for both therapeutic and nonther-
initially by a single-judge district court, thereby possibly obviating the need for a three-judge
court to be empaneled to consider the constitutional question. See Westby v. Doe, 420 U.S.
968 (1975), vacating and remanding in light of Hagans v. Lavine, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D.
1974) (mem.) (three-judge court), where the Court vacated and remanded the judgment of a
three-judge court convened to consider the constitutional question prior to a single judge's
determination of the pendent statutory claim.
36 380 F. Supp. at 730. The court of appeals remarked that there were three differing
view points regarding "the meaning and effect of Title XIX as to coverage for abortion
services . . . ." 522 F.2d at 931. Plaintiffs took the position that Title XIX prohibits states
from denying reimbursement for elective abortions. The State of Connecticut, on the other
hand, contended that Title XIX not only does not require a state to provide coverage for
nontherapeutic abortions, but actually prohibits such coverage. The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, submitting an amicus curiae brief, occupied the middle ground,
maintaining that although Title XIX does not preclude a state from providing medical
assistance for elective abortions, neither does it require a state to provide such assistance. Id.
at 931-32. By accepting the plaintiffs' position, and therefore concluding that the Connect-
icut regulation was inconsistent with Tide XIX, the district court avoided a determination of
the constitutional issue.
37380 F. Supp. at 729-31. The "doubts as to constitutionality" referred to by the court
arose from the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which held
that a woman has a constitutional right, at least during the first trimester of pregnancy, to
undergo an abortion upon demand. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra. The district
court feared that if Title XIX did not prohibit the Connecticut regulation, its effect would be
to sanction impermissible state interference in a decision which, in the first trimester,
belongs to the mother and her physician.
38 522 F.2d at 932.3 9 Id. at 933.
40Id. In its brief, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare noted that
"Medicaid programs are characterized by a high degree of diversity from state to state,
reflecting each state's own determination of its medical and social priorities." Memorandum
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975). As
the district court stated, "[t]he views of the agency administering the statute have weight in
determining its proper construction." 380 F. Supp. at 730, citing Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S.
552, 559 (1970).
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apeutic abortions are within the scope of medical assistance author-
ized under Tide XIX.4 1
In determining whether Title XIX allows reimbursement for
nontherapeutic abortions, the court of appeals adopted a two-step
analysis: First, whether coverage under Medicaid is limited to "nec-
essary medical services"; and second, if it is so limited, whether an
elective abortion is a necessary medical service.42 The court re-
solved the first question in the negative. 3 According to the Second
Circuit, the term "medically necessary services," as contained in
Tide XIX, is used as a limitation only to describe the "persons
eligible for Medicaid payments. '44 It is those persons "whose in-
come and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services" 45 who are eligible for medical assistance pursuant
to the statute. The applicant fulfills the eligibility criteria by show-
ing he is unable to meet the costs of necessary medical services; he
is not, however, required to show the necessity of the medical
service for which reimbursement is sought. In contrast to the eligi-
bility requirement, wherever the statute describes the services
reimbursable under Medicaid, it refers merely to "medical assis-
tance" without the limiting adjective "necessary. '46 Thus, it was the
court's opinion that services reimbursable under Title XIX "do not
include a 'medical necessity' requirement. 47
Judge Mulligan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
contended that Medicaid reimbursement should be provided only
for those services which are medically necessary. The Medicare
program under Title XVIII, which is related to the Medicaid
program, contains a stringent "medical necessity" requirement.48
Contending that the "medical necessity" requirement of Tide
XVIII should be superimposed upon the services covered under
41 522 F.2d at 933.
42 1. at 933-34.
43id. at 933.4 411 (emphasis in original), quoting 380 F. Supp. at 728.
4542 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970). Similar
language is found elsewhere in Title XIX. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp. IV,
1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i) (1970).
4522 F.2d at 933, quoting 380 F. Supp. at 728-29; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. IV,
1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
47 522 F.2d at 933.
4"See 42 U.S.C. 88 1395 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). The Medicare
program, which provides for health insurance for the aged, imposes a stricter requirement
of medical necessity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(1970), which provides, in part, that "no
payment may be made ... for any ... services ... which are not reasonable and necessary
for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a
malformed body member ......
1976]
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Tide XIX, 4 9 Judge Mulligan disagreed with the construction of the
majority, which, he reasoned, would compel coverage for purely
elective and unnecessary services such as cosmetic surgery. 50 He
concluded, therefore, that it is doubtful that Congress had in-
tended to provide payments for such treatment. 51
It is submitted that the argument advanced by that portion of
the dissent is less than persuasive. The legislative histories of Tides
XVIII and XIX do not clearly indicate that the necessity require-
ment contained in Medicare is applicable to Medicaid as well. 52
Furthermore, although the court's construction of Tide XIX could
make cosmetic surgery reimbursable, it would not compel the states
to provide such coverage. 53 The great latitude retained by the
4 9 Judge Mulligan declared that the legislative histories of Title XVIII and Title XIX
indicate that "a common interpretation is to be given both titles." 522 F.2d at 940 (Mulligan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). See S. REP. No. 404, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965), which notes that the purpose of both programs is "to provide a
coordinated approach for health insurance and medical care for the aged" and the needy.
Judge Newman, who authored the district court opinion, discussed this view, noting that if
Title XVIII's strong necessity requirement were not applicable to Title XIX, then Medicaid
would offer wider benefits than Medicare. This result would be anomalous, for "it is not
likely that Congress intended to provide broader benefits to the indigent [under Medicaid]
than to those who were purchasing coverage under Medicare." 380 F. Supp. at 729. Judge
Newman, however, held that even if this were to be accepted, a nontherapeutic abortion
would constitute a medically necessary service. Id. at 729-30.
50 522 F.2d at 940 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-11d, at 939-40. As Judge Mulligan stated, "[t]he whole tenor of Title XIX indicates the
intent to place some limit on medical assistance." Id. at 939 (footnote omitted).
52 As the Second Circuit noted, "'the Senate Report concerning Titles XVIII and XIX
reveals significant differences between these programs." Id. at 933 n.5. Indeed, in discussing
Medicare, the Senate Report states that "the bill would require that payment could be made
only if a physician certifies to the medical necessity of the services furnished." S. REP. No.
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1965). Yet, with regard to Title XIX, the same Report notes
that despite the fact that some types of medical services are required to be provided by the
states, "[c]overage of other items of medical service would be optional with the States." Id. at
9. The differences in coverage under Titles XVIII and XIX may be attributed to the fact
that Medicare (Title XVIII) is administered by the federal government, while Medicaid
(Title XIX) is administered by the states, albeit with partial federal funding. Thus, a state,
after providing the basic required Medicaid services, is given broad discretion as to addi-
tional coverage it may provide. This tends to refute the argument advanced in the lower
court, see note 49 supra, that if the medical necessity requirement of Title XVIII is not
applicable to Title XIX, then Medicaid would provide broader coverage than Medicare.
Clearly, the required coverage under Medicaid is not broader than that provided under
Medicare. It is only the optional coverage, which may be provided by the state, that may
result in broader coverage under Medicaid.
" Stating that the absence of a medical necessity requirement would, according to the
majority's construction of Title XIX, mandate that a state provide medical assistance for
elective cosmetic surgery, Judge Mulligan seemingly ignored the fact that the court was
addressing the question of which services fall within the ambit of the Medicaid Act. The
majority simply observed that Title XIX contains no medical necessity requirement. Thus,
both nontherapeutic abortions and elective cosmetic surgery are reimbursable under Title
XIX if the state elected to so provide. Nowhere does the majority remotely suggest that the
states are compelled to provide reimbursement for these services simply because Title XIX
permits such coverage. As the court noted, "[o]ur holding does not compel Medicaid
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states permits them to make their own determinations concerning
optional services reimbursable under Title XIX. While states may
decide to provide such coverage, they need not do so.5 4
Assuming, arguendo, that there exists in Title XIX a require-
ment of medical necessity, the court noted that an elective abortion
could be deemed a "medical necessity, '55 since "[p]regnancy is
plainly a physical condition which requires medical attention. '56 A
woman with such a "condition" may either carry her pregnancy to
term, culminating in childbirth and necessitating medical services
including prenatal, obstetrical, and postpartum care, or elect to
undergo an abortion, which also involves certain "necessary medi-
cal services," including the cost of the abortion and subsequent
care.5 7 The majority refused to view the costs of an abortion as less
"necessary" than the costs that would have resulted had the woman
elected to carry her pregnancy to term.58
assistance for any particular medical service. Coverage which is not required by the statute is
optional with the states." 522 F.2d at 934 n.5.
54 Id. at 933-34 n.5. See note 36 supra.
55 522 F.2d at 934.
56 Id57 1d.
58Id; accord, Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(per curiam) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded in light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton, 412 U.S. 925 (1973), on remand, 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (per curiam)
(three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. Toia v. Klein, 44 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. June 2,
1976) (No. 75-1749). In Klein, the original three-judge court remarked that
(p]regnancy is a condition which in today's society is universally treated as requiring
medical care, prenatal, obstetrical, and post-partum care, and undeniably it is
provided under the Medicaid program as "necessary" medical assistance although
pregnancy is not an abnormal condition, nor does the medical assistance in
childbirth "cure" it. Medical assistance for abortion is not less "necessary" because
an election to bear the child would obviate that medical assistance and require
instead other, more extensive and more expensive medical assistance.
347 F. Supp. at 500.
For a discussion of the viability of Klein in light of the remand, see Note, Implications of
the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 237, 250
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Implications]. Some of the abortion cases cited in this Note were
eventually vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for consideration in light of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), thereby creating a
question as to their viability. See, e.g., Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah) (three-
judge court), vacated and remanded in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 950 (1973). It is
interesting to note that the Supreme Court has vacated and remanded, or denied certiorari
to many other abortion cases dealing with subject matter far beyond the scope of this article.
See, e.g., Rosen v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 412 U.S. 902 (1973), vacating and
remanding in light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970)
(three-judge court). Possibly the Court simply did not wish to decide other abortion cases
that year. A more plausible explanation is that the Court wanted the lower courts to phrase
their decisions "within the fundamental ight/compelling state interest analysis utilized in Roe
[v. Wade] and Doe [v. Bolton]." Implications, supra, at 250 (footnote omitted). In Roe v.
Norton, 522 F.2d at 936-37, the court of appeals cited some of these cases, indicating that, in
the court's opinion, these cases do maintain viability. In Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1116
n.3 (10th Cir. 1974), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in referring to such a case,
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Judge Mulligan disagreed with this reasoning, stating that the
court cannot
equate abortion and childbearing as two comparable solutions to
pregnancy under Title XIX. The pregnancy of the mother, ab-
sent miscarriage, inevitably and biologically terminates in the
birth of the child, a process which today at least requires medical
attention and assistance. Abortion, on the other hand, requires
medical services only because the mother has made a voluntary
decision which may or may not be dictated by medical necessity.59
By apparently seeking to equate an elective abortion with elective
cosmetic surgery, in that both result from a purely voluntary deci-
sion on the part of the patient, 60 Judge Mulligan seemingly ignores
a critical distinction. An abortion is predicated upon the fact that
the woman is pregnant, a "condition" for which the state will allow
reimbursement should the mother choose to "cure" her "condition"
by childbirth. A condition leading to elective cosmetic surgery, on
the other hand, has never been determined by the state to be a
"condition" warranting Medicaid assistance. By arguing that the
costs of an abortion are less necessary than the costs of childbirth,
Judge Mulligan would deny reimbursement for elective abortions
because the mother has made a disfavored choice with regard to
the treatment of her "condition. 6 1
Although the Second Circuit held that Title XIX does not
prohibit a state from including elective abortions in its Medicaid
coverage, it disagreed with the district court's opinion that the
statute mandates such coverage. 62 The court reasoned that since
nontherapeutic abortions were illegal in most states when Title
XIX was enacted, 63 Congress could not have intended that Title
noted that "we are also of the opinion that the remand does not affect the viability of the
language here quoted ...."
59 522 F.2d at 941 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6 0 Id. at 940-41.
61 A similar argument has been rejected in the past. See note 58 supra. In Doe v. Beal,
523 F.2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No.
75-554), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in declaring a Pennsylvania regulation
similar to that under consideration in Roe v. Norton to be inconsistent with Title XIX, noted
that since the state
pays for full-term deliveries and also for therapeutic abortions, it is plain that the
state has determined, in its discretion, that pregnancy is a condition for which
medical treatment is "necessary" within the meaning of Title XIX. The next ques-
tion is whether some justification can be found in the statute for preventing an
attending physician from choosing non-therapeutic abortions as the method for
treating a pregnancy. We can find none.
523 F.2d at 621-22 (footnote omitted).
62 522 F.2d at 935.
6 21d., citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 n.2 (1973).
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XIX require states to provide assistance for elective abortions. 64
Consequently, Title XIX could not have been intended to prohibit
state regulations denying payment for elective abortions. Judge
Mulligan agreed with this conclusion, but insisted on going one
step further. 65 He argued that since elective abortions were gener-
ally unlawful when Title XIX was enacted, the intent of Congress
must have been to preclude a state from reimbursing a'patient for
a nontherapeutic abortion. 66
Despite the persuasiveness of Judge Mulligan's reasoning, the
holding of the majority appears correct. In enacting Title XIX,
Congress provided the states with wide discretion to determine
"the content of their Medicaid programs. '67 While the fact that
elective abortions were illegal in most states strongly supports the
belief that Title XIX does not require states to provide reimburse-
ment for such abortions, the added fact that the states were free at
any time to revise their legislation to legalize the performance of
nontherapeutic abortions68 may indicate that Congress did not
intend to prohibit reimbursement for such abortions. More consist-
ent with the omission of any reference to abortion in Title XIX, is
the view that Congress left the decision to state determination. 69
While congressional silence should not be interpreted as requiring
the states to pay for elective abortions, neither should that same
silence be construed as prohibiting the states from paying for
nontherapeutic abortions.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit does not stand alone
in its construction of Title XIX. In Roe v. Ferguson,7 0 the Court of Ap-
In construing Title XIX, the court concluded that
[i]n the light of the circumstances and conditions at the time the statute was
enacted, the absence of any language in the statute regarding the subject, and the
lack of legislative history indicating a contrary position, it cannot be supposed that
Congress, in 1965, intended to or did impose a requirement that states must
provide coverage for elective abortions when the criminal statutes of the majority of
the states forbade the performance of such abortions.
522 F.2d at 935.
"Id at 939 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66 See id.
67 Memorandum for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as Amicus
Curiae at 4, Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928. See note 36 supra.
" See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL Law § 125.05 (McKinney 1975) which, prior to Wade, permitted
elective abortions within the first 24 weeks of pregnancy. See notes 1-4 and accompanying
text supra.9 See Roev. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279,283 (6th Cir. 1975), wherein the CourtofAppeals for
the Sixth Circuit commented that where Congress wanted to preclude a statute's applicability
to elective abortions, it had specifically excluded them. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970); 42
U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (Supp. IV, 1974). It can be inferred from the specificity exhibited in
other statutes that where Congress omitted any specific exclusion with regard to elective
abortions, as in Title XIX, there was no intent to require or preclude coverage.
70 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975). In Ferguson, an Ohio statute, similar in effect to the
1976]
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peals for the Sixth Circuit also construed Title XIX as authorizing,
but not requiring, reimbursement under Medicaid for nonther-
apeutic abortions. 71 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, in Doe v. Rose,7 2 indicated that nothing in Title XIX would
bar a policy of nonreimbursement for elective abortions. 73 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, in Doe v. Beal, 74 held
that a Pennsylvania regulation limiting Medicaid assistance to ther-
apeutic abortions was inconsistent with Title XIX.7 5 The Beal court
ruled that the Medicaid Act mandates that alternative forms of
treatment for a medical condition, in this case pregnancy, are to be
determined solely by the physician and patient without state inter-
vention or coercion. 76
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
In addition to their statutory claim, the Roe v. Norton plaintiffs
also contended that section 275 violated the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Constitution. The court of appeals re-
fused to discuss the constitutional questions, instead remanding for
consideration by a three-judge court. 77 The court agreed with the
district court's determination that the constitutional issue was suffi-
ciently substantial to invoke federal jurisdiction, and hence, had to
Connecticut regulation denying medical assistance for nontherapeutic abortions, was held to
be consistent with Title XIX.
71 Id. at 283. The court stated that in "the absence of a legislative history indicating a
contrary position . .. we cannot say that the statute itself prohibits such an exclusion." Id.
72499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974). At issue in Rose was an unwritten informal policy
followed by the executive director of the Utah State Department of Social Services, which
denied Medicaid reimbursement for abortions unless they were certified by him as therapeu-
tic. Id. at 1113. As the Ferguson court noted, Rose involved an informal policy, thereby
obviating the need for a three-judge court to determine the constitutional issue. 515 F.2d at
282 n.11.
13 499 F.2d at 1114. The court did, however, hold that such a policy was violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1117.
74 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No.
75-554), modifying and remanding sub nom. Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa.
1974) (three-judge court).
75 523 F.2d at 621-22.
76 The Beal court indicated that although states enjoy much discretion in determining
the content of their Medicaid programs, they must comply with the objectives of Title XIX.
One such objective, according to the court, is the placement of the primary authority to
determine the appropriate treatment for a patient "in the hands of the attending physician."
Id. at 618. Thus, once the state has determined that pregnancy is a condition that requires
medical treatment, alternative methods of treatment, including elective abortion, are to be
determined by the physician. ld. at 620-21; accord, Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (D.S.D.)
(three-judge court),petitionfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1975) (No. 75-813).
7 522 F.2d at 937-39. The trial court, consisting of a single judge, could decide only the
statutory issue. Constitutional considerations must be determined by a three-judge district
court. Since the district court could not decide the constitutional question, the Second
Circuit was similarly precluded. See note 35 supra.
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be decided by a three-judge court.7 8 In making this determination,
the Second Circuit was in disagreement with the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, which, finding a Missouri statute limiting
Title XIX reimbursement to therapeutic abortions to be patently
unconstitutional, held that it was unnecessary to convene a three-
judge court. 79 Despite this procedural conflict among the circuits,
all federal courts which have considered the constitutionality of a
state statute or regulation barring Medicaid payments for elective
abortions have declared it violative of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.8 0 Indeed, when Roe v. Norton was
heard on remand, the three-judge court declared the Connecticut
regulation to be in contravention of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.
8
'
71 522 F.2d at 937-38.
79 Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W.
5213 (U.S. July 1, 1976). The statute in question restricted Title XIX reimbursement to
therapeutic abortions. A three-judge district court had dismissed the suit for lack of stand-
ing. 508 F.2d at 1212. Nevertheless, the court of appeals decided that since the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute was "obvious and patent," a three-judge court was not needed. Id. at
1215. Under the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528
(1974), patent unconstitutionality is equivalent to constitutional insubstantiality. Id. at 537. A
claim is considered insubstantial "only if 'its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous
decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the
questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.' "Id. at 538, quoting Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Roe v.
Norton did not consider § 275 to be patently unconstitutional, nor did it consider a claim of
constitutionality to be insubstantial. 522 F.2d at 937-38. The Roe v. Norton court thus
specifically disagreed with the ruling of the IVu/ffcourt. Id. at 938 n. 15. Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975), also took
issue with the Wulff court on this question.
It is submitted that the Roe v. Norton conclusion is the better one. The Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), decided only that certain state statutes rendering the
performance of abortions criminal were unconstitutional. It never decided that a restriction
on Medicaid payments for abortions was similarly unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality
of the state Medicaid statutes is not foreclosed by Wade, nor by any other Supreme Court
decision, and, therefore, the necessity of convening a three-judge court is not obviated. See
522 F.2d at 938.
80 Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd on oier grounds, 44
U.S.L.W. 5213 (U.S.July 1, 1976); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v.
Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (D.S.D. 1974) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded in
light of Hagans v. Lavine, 420 U.S. 968, on remand, 402 F. Supp. 140, 144 (D.S.D. 1975)
(mem.) (three-judge court), petition for cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1975) (No.
75-813); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 186-92 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (three-judge court),
modified and remanded sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-554); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D.
Utah) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 950 (1973);
Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496,500 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (per curiam)
(three-judge court), vacated and remanded in light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 412 U.S.
925 (1973), on remand, 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (per curiam) (three-judge court),
appeal docketed sub nom. Toia v. Klein, 44 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. June 2, 1976) (No. 75-1749).
"' 408 F. Supp. 660, 663-64 (D. Conn. 1975) (mem.) (three-judge court), prob.juris. noted
sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-1440), on remand from
522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g and remanding 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974) (mem.).
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In holding the Connecticut regulation unconstitutional, Judge
Newman, speaking for a unanimous court, 82 premised his constitu-
tional analysis upon the Supreme Court's decision in Wade.8 3
There, the Court indicated that a woman has a fundamental right
to choose an abortion,8 4 and that while this right is not absolute, 85
any "regulation limiting [this right] may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest' . ."86 The Wade Court concluded that
during the first trimester of pregnancy there is no compelling state
interest to justify interference with the abortion decision.8 7 After
the first trimester, "a State may regulate the abortion procedure to
the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health.18 8 Once the point of viability s
is reached, however, the state's interest in protecting "the potential-
ity of human life"90 becomes compelling and allows the state to
proscribe abortion completely, except where abortion is necessary
to preserve the "life or health of the mother." 91 Thus, during the first
trimester a woman may choose an abortion free from any state
interference, and from the beginning of the second trimester until
viability a woman's fundamental right to an abortion may only be
regulated by the state to the extent that it "reasonably relates to the
preservation and protection of maternal health. 92
Pursuant to traditional equal protection analysis,1 3 a classifica-
tion established by a state will be upheld if it is rationally based and
bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the statute.94 If,
82 District Judge Newman, who had also written the earlier single-judge district court
decision in Roe v. Norton, was joined in this opinion by Circuit Judge Timbers and District
Judge Zampano.
83408 F. Supp. at 663.
14 410 U.S. at 153; see note 2supra. Presumably this right is fundamental since the Court
had previously stated that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy." 410 U.S. at 152,quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on
other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
s5410 U.S. at 154; see note 2 supra.
86410 U.S. at 155; see note 3 supra.
87410 U.S. at 163.
S ld.
s9 See note 4 supra.
90410 U.S. at 164.
9 Id. at 163-64.
92Jd.
9 For discussions of the various theories of equal protection, see Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term - Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949) [hereinafter cited
as Equal Protection]; Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
94 In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Court stated: "A
classification having some reasonable basis does not offend . . . [the equal protection clause]
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in
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however, a "fundamental right" or a "suspect classification" is in-
volved, the classification will be strictly scrutinized and, unless a
compelling state interest is found to justify the classification, will be
found constitutionally impermissible. 95 Had the Roe v. Norton plain-
tiffs decided to carry their pregnancies to term, the state would
have provided reimbursement. When they decided, instead, to
excercise their fundamental constitutional right 96 to choose an elec-
tive abortion rather than bear a child, reimbursement was denied.
It would appear that Connecticut's infringement of plaintiffs' right
to an elective abortion denied plaintiffs equal protection of the
laws.9 7
As the three-judge Roe v. Norton court correctly noted, how-
ever, the fact that there is a constitutional right to choose an abor-
tion does not necessarily mean there is "a constitutional right to a
free abortion, with the state obligated to absorb the cost of the
medical procedure." 98 While the receipt of medical assistance or
welfare benefits may be a right, it is by no means a "fundamental"
right, and hence, a compelling state interest need not be advanced
to justify such a classification.99 While this is undoubtedly true, it
some inequafity." Id at 78; accord, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). See also
Equal Protection, supra note 93, at 345.
9 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (right to vote);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (right to avoid nonconsensual sterilization). With regard to "suspect
classifications," the Harper Court noted that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or prop-
erty, like those of race ... are traditionally disfavored." 383 U.S. at 668 (dictum) (citation
omitted). Despite this language, "wealth" has not specifically been declared by the Court to
be a "suspect classification." See Gunther, supra note 93, at 9-10.
96 While it is true that the Wade Court found a "fundamental right" only in the context
of due process, many courts, in determining whether a state regulation or statute violated
the equal protection clause, have used the fundamental right, as declared by the Wade Court,
to trigger strict scrutiny, thereby necessitating a showing of a compelling state interest to
justify the classification. See, e.g., Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1115-17 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe
v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 189-90, 191-92 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (three-judge court),
modified and remanded sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-554).
97 Plaintiffs suggested a number of classifications which worked to deny them equal
protection. First, plaintiffs were denied their right to have an abortion "solely because of
their indigency." Other women, more affluent, who can afford to pay for their own abor-
tion, have no such restriction. Second, plaintiffs who have made a "disfavored choice" are
denied medical assistance, while women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term are
reimbursed under Title XIX. Finally, plaintiffs have to "undergo the burdensome and
time-consuming procedure of obtaining prior approval of a service authorized by their
physicians," while "approval is not required for any other hospital procedure .... " Brief for
Plaintiffs at 22, Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) (mem.) (three-judge court)
(on remand). A possible fourth classification, not presented by the plaintiffs, is the distinc-
tion between an indigent woman seeking a therapeutic abortion and an indigent mother
seeking an elective abortion.
98 408 F. Supp. at 663; accord, 380 F. Supp. at 730.
99408 F. Supp. at 663, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). InDandridge,
the Supreme Court used the traditional standard of equal protection with regard to welfare
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does not sufficiently refute plaintiffs' argument. As the three-judge
court stated, although a state need not provide any medical assis-
tance whatsoever, when it does elect to fund therapeutic abortions
and childbirth and yet, refuses to pay for nontherapeutic abortions,
the state "weights the choice of the pregnant mother against choos-
ing to exercise her constitutionally protected right to an elective
abortion." 100 The three-judge court held that the coercive effect of
such a regulation infringing upon fundamental rights is sufficient
to trigger strict scrutiny of the state's classification and thus require
the assertion of a compelling state interest to justify the intru-
sion.1 01
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 102 the Supreme Court, in declaring the
right to interstate travel to be a "fundamental right" which was
improperly impeded by a state regulation imposing a 1-year wait-
ing period to qualify for welfare benefits, 10 3 noted that "any
benefits, thereby implying that the receipt of welfare by an indigent is not a "fundamental
right" requiring strict scrutiny. The Court noted that
the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. . . . It is
enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimina-
tion.
Id at 486-87 (emphasis added); cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). For a more
extensive discussion of aid to the indigent in the context of equal protection, see Dienes, To
Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1970);
Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 210 (1967). See
generally Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term -Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
100 408 F. Supp. at 663. Judge Newman noted:
The Constitution does not require the state to pay for any medical services at all.
Nevertheless, once a state chooses to establish a program for reimbursing the
medical expenses of the indigent, and adopts as part of that program a provision
that requires state funding for medical expenses arising from pregnancy, a serious
equal protection issue arises if the state refuses to reimburse expenses incurred in
procuring an abortion.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also id. n.3.
10i Id. at 664. The court distinguished Dandridge, stating that the state law in that case
did not impinge "upon the exercise of a constitutionally protected right." Id. at 663; accord,
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 n.21 (1974). Thus, where the
classification only involves an allocation of welfare benefits and does not impinge upon
fundamental rights, the courts will uphold the classification if it is rationally based. On the
other hand, where the allocation infringes upon fundamental rights, as in the instant case, a
compelling state interest must be asserted or the classification will fail as constitutionally
defective. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
102 3 9 4 U.S. 618 (1969).
"' In Shapiro, a statute had been promulgated denying welfare assistance to applicants
who resided in the state for a period of less than 1 year. Id. at 622. The Court noted that
[w]e do not doubt that the one-year waiting-period device is well suited to discour-
age the influx of poor families in need of assistance . . . . But the purpose of
inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissi-
ble.
Id. at 629. With respect to interstate travel being a fundamental right, the Court stated that
" '[tihe constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized.' "Id. at 630, quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757 (1966).
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classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional."' 0 4 In denying medical assistance to an
indigent mother who elects an abortion while providing assistance
to those who choose to carry their pregnancies to term, Connect-
icut is clearly not depriving women of a fundamental right, as
there is no fundamental right to a free abortion. Nevertheless, as
the court indicated, the practical effect of such a regulation is to
impinge upon the fundamental right to choose an abortion.
In Shapiro, the Court, in dicta, seemed to limit its holding to a
denial of welfare benefits which affect "the ability ... to obtain the
very means to subsist -food, shelter, and other necessities of
life."' 0 5 Additionally, the Court emphasized the fact that the dura-
tional residency requirement served to penalize the exercise of the
fundamental right to interstate travel. 10 6 Thus, not all restrictions
upon the exercise of a fundamental right constitute penalties.' 0 7
Subsequently, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 108 the Court
reiterated this position. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court,
specifically stated that Shapiro is not operative unless a classification
serves to penalize the exercise of a fundamental right.109 Moreover,
the Maricopa Court intimated that the "parameters of the Shapiro
penalty analysis" depend upon whether the classification would
operate to deprive an individual of the basic necessities of life."10
The Court noted that "governmental privileges or benefits neces-
sary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater
constitutional significance than less essential forms of governmen-
tal entitlements.""' Viewed in this light, it appears that Shapiro
mandates the presence of two factors in order to apply a strict
scrutiny test within the context of state welfare entitlement. The
classification must act to penalize the exercise of a fundamental
right and the penalty must affect the basic necessities of life.' 2
Thus, the Court in Shapiro determined that although there is no "fundamental right" to
receive welfare benefits, the restriction of such benefits by the use of a I-year residency
requirement placed a "chill" upon, and served to penalize, the exercise of the fundamental
right to interstate travel. This was sufficient, in the Court's view, to trigger strict scrutiny of
the state's law.
104 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
'10 Id at 627.
1
0
61d at 634.
10 7 See id. at 638 n.21, where the Court noted that not all waiting periods are penalties.
Accord, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
108 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
'
0 91d. at 256-62.
"
01d at 259.
"I Id
112 Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare payments constitute
necessities of life), and Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (emergency
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The facts of Roe v. Norton fulfill Shapiro's dual requirement. By
denying reimbursement of the abortion costs to indigent women,
the state is virtually forcing them to have an unwanted child.
Indigent mothers and their families, already straining to shelter,
clothe, and feed themselves with whatever governmental entitle-
ments they can obtain, might indeed be taxed beyond the breaking
point. Clearly then, the denial of Medicaid reimbursement to the
indigent mother for a nontherapeutic abortion and the resultant
coercive effect of this denial involve the basic necessities of life
necessary to trigger a Shapiro penalty analysis. And, since the Con-
necticut regulation directly hinders the mother's choice to undergo
an elective abortion, it acts as a penalty to the exercise of her
fundamental right, thereby satisfying the other requirement of
Shapiro and requiring a compelling state interest to justify it.
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
stated in the context of a public hospital refusing to perform
voluntary sterilizations, "once the state has undertaken to provide
general short-term hospital care . . . it may not constitutionally
draw the line at medically indistinguishable surgical procedures
that impinge on fundamental rights."'1 13 Clearly, the facilities and
procedures required for both therapeutic and nontherapeutic
abortions are medically indistinguishable. In fact, it would seem
that a therapeutic abortion would place greater strain upon the
hospital's facilities and the state's resources, since the mother's life
medical care constitutes necessities of life), with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (dura-
tional residency requirement to obtain a divorce distinguishable in that divorce does not
constitute a necessity of life), and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (durational residency
requirement for reduced tuition at the state university distinguishable in that attending a
university is not a necessity of life). Of course, where the statute, as written, imposes a
classification directly involving a fundamental right, there is no need to resort to a Shapiro
penalty analysis. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). The regulation in Roe v.
Norton, however, does not, as written, directly involve a fundamental right, since its purpose
is only to regulate Medicaid disbursements. Nonetheless, in application it tends to affect the
fundamental right to choose an abortion. As such, a Shapiro penalty analysis is required to
determine whether strict scrutiny is appropriate. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), wherein the Court refused to strictly scrutinize a state's denial of welfare benefits, see
note 99 supra, must be distinguished in that no fundamental right was involved. Hence, a
Shapiro penalty analysis, in that case, was inappropriate. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 262 n.21 (1974).
113 Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir.), applicationfor stay
denied, 411 U.S. 929 (1973) (citations omitted). In Hathaway, the plaintiff, who already had
"twelve pregnancies resulting in eight live offspring," requested a voluntary sterilization to
be performed in the defendant's facilities. 475 F.2d at 702-03. The hospital's policy, how-
ever, prohibited the utilization of its facilities in connection with a sterilization procedure. Id.
at 703. The court, relying, inter alia, upon Shapiro, noted that "an), infringement of a
fundamental interest, including the simple denial of a benefit must be carefully scrutinized."
Id. at 705 n.2. The court subsequently reaffirmed this position in Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500
F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975).
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or health are in jeopardy. Thus, even though a state may have no
obligation to provide any medical assistance for indigent mothers
who are pregnant, once the state does determine to give such
medical assistance, it cannot invidiously discriminate between indis-
tinguishable medical procedures that impinge upon fundamental
rights, and must provide assistance for both therapeutic and
nontherapeutic abortions alike.
The Roe v. Norton three-judge court determined that there was
no state interest sufficiently compelling to justify the state's infringe-
ment upon the indigent mother's fundamental rights. 1 4 Connect-
icut had asserted its "fiscal interest" in denying medical assistance
for nontherapeutic abortions." 5 The court replied that "[t]his
interest is wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to a pregnancy." ' 1 6 Moreover, as the Shapiro
Court declared, although the state has a legitimate interest in
preserving its fiscal integrity, "the saving of welfare costs cannot
justify an otherwise invidious classification." 117 Thus, Connecticut's
assertion of a fiscal motive as the compelling governmental interest
necessary to justify its infringement is both "contrary to undisputed
facts" ' 8 and unwarranted in law.
In Wade, the Court stated that there can be no compelling state
interest to justify interference with the abortion decision, at least
during the first trimester of pregnancy. 19 Thus, it is submitted
that as a matter of law there is no state interest sufficiently compel-
ling to justify any interference with the abortion decision during
the first trimester. Any other interpretation would allow a state to
dilute the Wade mandate by permitting indirect state interference
114 408 F. Supp. at 664.
'Is Prior to the Second Circuit's remand, Connecticut's position had been that Title XIX
precluded it from reimbursing nontherapeutic abortions under the Medicaid program. 380
F. Supp. at 728 & n.2; 522 F.2d at 931. In holding that Title XIX does not require states to
deny medical assistance for elective abortions, the Second Circuit opened the door for
Connecticut to demonstrate its good faith and eliminate § 275. Connecticut did not, how-
ever, rescind the regulations, but sought to justify its position on the basis of "fiscal interest."
408 F. Supp. at 664.
116 408 F. Supp. at 664.
117 394 U.S. at 633 (footnote omitted).
118 408 F. Supp. at 664. The court also commented that the state could not justify such a
classification on the basis that it finds the expenditure of public funds for nontherapeutic
abortions "morally objectionable." Id. As the court stated:
To sanction such a justification would be to permit discrimination against those
seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right... The state's unarticulated position on the
morality of abortion cannot be considered a compelling state interest that will justify
the weighting of a choice against the exercise of a constitutional right.
Id (citation omitted).
119 See text accompanying notes 84-92 supra.
19761
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
with a constitutional right- a constitutional right which must be
free from both subtle and overt state interference and coercion.
CONCLUSION
The recent profusion of state regulations denying Medicaid
assistance for nontherapeutic abortions, 120 the unanimity among
the federal courts as to their unconstitutionality, 121 and the conflict
among the circuits as to the construction of Title XIX 122 demand
the attention of the nation's highest court. If the principles an-
nounced in the Supreme Court's landmark decision of Roe v. Wade
are to continue as the law of the land, it would appear that no state
may constitutionally deny medical assistance to an indigent woman
seeking a nontherapeutic abortion. Hopefully, the Supreme
Court's recent decision to review Roe v. Norton1 23 will put an end to
the exhaustive litigation in this area.*
Zave M. Unger
120 See, e.g., Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g and remanding 380 F. Supp.
726 (D. Conn. 1974) (mem.), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) (mem.) (three-
judge court), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976)
(No. 75-1440) (Connecticut regulation); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975) (Ohio
statute); Wulffv. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W.
5213 (U.S. July 1, 1976) (Missouri statute); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974)
(Utah "informal policy"); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974) (three-judge
court), vacated and remanded in light of Hagans v. Lavine, 420 U.S. 968, on remand, 402 F. Supp.
140 (D.S.D. 1975) (mem.) (three-judge court), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S.
Dec. 8, 1975) (No. 75-813) (South Dakota regulation); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173
(W.D. Pa. 1974) (three-judge court), modified and remanded sub nom. Doe ,. Beal, 523 F.2d 611
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-554) (Pennsylvania
regulation); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah) (three-judge court), vacated and
remanded in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 950 (1973) (Utah statute); Klein v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (per curiam) (three-judge court), vacated
and remanded in light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 412 U.S. 925 (1973), an remand, 409 F.
Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y.) (per curiam) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. Toia v. Klein,
44 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. June 2, 1976) (No. 75-1749) (New York "administrative letter").
12l See cases cited in note 80 supra.
122 See notes 70-76 and accompanying text supra.
123 Roe v. Norton, prob.juris. noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S.July 6,
1976) (No. 75-1440). At the same time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Doe v. Beal,
44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 75-554). The former case will present the Court
with the constitutional question, while the Beal case concerns the statutory issues.
* Editor's Note: As this Comment was being printed, Congress enacted Public Law
94-439, the Departments of Labor, Health Education and Welfare Appropriations Act of
1977, which includes an amendment of Title XIX specifically barring Medicaid reimburse-
ment for nontherapeutic abortions. On October 22, 1976, however, United States District
Judge Dooling declared the amendment unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement,
ordering HEW to continue its policy of granting medical assistance for elective abortions.
McRae v. Mathews, No. 76-C-1804 (E.D.N.Y. October 22, 1976). Subsequently, the United
States Supreme Court declined to stay the injunctive order pending appeal. Buckley v.
McRae, 45 U.S.L.W. 3344 (No. A-346) (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976).
